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[erim. No. 6243. In Bank. Oct. 1, 1958J --THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBE:W,t.)J9SHANN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Witnesse&-PrivilegedOommQi.J:&tioDS-PubUc Officers.-De-
fendant was entitled to disclosure of the identity of the in-
former where an alleged sale of he.!1!in.}y d~fendant was made 
to an inform~r, eviden~(Lth.a".Lc!.!!fend.!mt received two telephone 
calls from the informer and made a sale to the informer did 
not establish that he knew the informer's identity, and that 
very evidence was in iss~ view of defendant's denial that 
he received such calls or that he made such sale j in the absence 
of a finding that defendant knew·tne" informer it could not 
be assumed that he did. 
[2] Id.-Privileged Oomm11DicatioDS-PubUc Officera.-The com-
mon-law privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity 
is based on publi~y, its ~se being the furtherance 
and protection of the.lt!!blic interest in effective ~~w enforce-
._." ment mil in assuring e informer of Borne protection against 
reprisals j disclosure of" th!! jnformer's identity ord'mirily "CR-
atroys his usefulness in obtaining information thereafter. 
[Sa, Sb] Id.~Privileged OommunicationS-PubUc Officers.-Under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 6, encompassing the privilege 
of nondisclosure of informers, _~~~st is whether the pu~~ 
interest would suffer by the disclosure. 
[4] Id.-Privileged Oomm11DicatioDS-PubUc Officera.-It is for 
the court to determine whether the public interest will suffer 
by disclosure of an informer. 
[1] Privilege of communication made to public officera, notes, 9 
A.L.B. 1099; 59 A.L.B. 1555. See also Oal.J'ur., Witnesses, § 31 j 
Am.J'ur., Witnesses, §§ 535,536. 
14cX. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Witnesses, 160. 
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[6] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-At common 
law the privilege.of nondiselo!lllreo1:an informer_c~~~ot 
be invoked if the identity of the informer was known to those 
who had eause to resent the communieation. 
[6] Id.-Privileged Communication&-Public Oflicers.-A defend-
ant who knows the identity of an informer is not ordinarily 
prejudiced by refusal to disclose that identity. 
[7] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-There is no 
privilege of nondisclosure of an informer if disclosure is rele-
vant and helpful to the defense of the aeeused or essential 
to a fair determination of a cause. 
[8] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-Disclosure 
of an informer is not limited to the Jwormer who participates 
in the crime alleged; the information elicited from an in-
former may be relevant and helpful to the defense of the 
aecused or essential to a fair determination of a cause though 
the informer was uot a participant, a1l where the testimony of 
an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer would vindieate the 
innocence of the aceused or lessen the risk of false testimony. 
[9] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-Identity of 
an informer is ordinarily not neeessary to defendant's ease, 
and the privilege against nondisclo),pre prQperlY II,plllies. -
[10] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-When it 
appears from the evidenee that an informer is a material wit-
ness on the issue of guilt, his identity is relevant and may be 
helpful to defendant; nondiselosure woul.d. Ael>!ive him of a 
fair trial. 
[11] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-When it 
appears from the evidence that an informer is a J:.Daterial wit-
ness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks djsclosure 
on cross-examination, the People must either disclose his 
identity or ineur a dismissal. (Disapp~o.Yl!t.E implications to 
the eontrary inPeopZe v. Cox, 156 Cal.App.2d 472, 477 [319 
P.2d 681); People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal.App.2d 437, 440-441 
[288 P.2d 588).) . 
[12] Id.-Privileged Communications-Publie Oflicers.-Where, in 
a proseeution for u~Is..wfULpossession of heroin, an infQwer's 
telephone eall to defendant was persuasiye evidenee on pos-
session as indieating that defendant was en route to make a 
sale of heroin when he was arrested and therefore knowingly 
had possession at the time, andwhere .. the People, instead of 
relying solely on the testimony of the officers as to defendant's 
possession of heroin and as to his admissions without refer-
ence to the telephone eall, made the informer a witness by in; 
troducing evidence of his telephone call and by playing a 
reeording of the telephone eonversation before the jury, the--' 
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terial witness on the iuue of po88ession, and defendant, 
denied receiving the call, had DO fair opportunity tolnl~ 
stantiate his denial and impeach the testimony of the omcers 
without disclosure of the informer's identity, and refuaal to 
disclose his identity was prejudicial error. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of A1a-
meda County. Marvin Sherwin, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for illegal sale and possession of heroin. Judg-
ment of conviction reversed. . 
Vaughns, Dixon & White and Clinton W. White for Ap-
pellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy At-
torney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction on two counts of violation of section 11500 of the 
Health and Safety Code. Count one charged a sale of heroin 
on November 26, 1956. Count two charged possession of 
heroin on November 27, 1956. 
The prosecution's evidence showed that on November 26, 
1956, Police Officers McBee, Hilliard, Leen, and Goodrum 
met a con1idential informer in Oakland. Officers McBee and 
Hilliard searched the informer and found no narcotics on ,; 
him. The informer, accompanied by the four officers, then J 
went to the Oakland Police Department where he made an .. 
appointment by telephone for the purchase of narcotics from , 
defendant. Officer McBee dialed the number listed for the 
residence of defendant, and a recording was made of the eon-
versation. Officers McBee, Hilliard, and Goodrum were pres-
ent during the telephone conversation and laterlisteued to the 
recording. The recording was played before the jury, and 
the officers identified the voice talking to the informer as de-
fendant's. 
The officers gave the informer a $20 bill, a $10 bm and a 
$5.00 bill, each dusted with fluorescent powder. 'l'bey took 
him to the vicinity of Market and Grand Streets where he 
entered an automobile driven by defendant. 0fIieer McBee 
followed the automobile until he lost sight of it. Ten or 
fifteen minutes later the informer entered Officer McBee's 
automobile at 21st and Market Streets and gave OfIieer McBee 
) 
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a small bindle containing a white powder later identified as 
heroin. Otftct'r Goodrum saw the informer enter the auto-
mobile identified as defendant's and followed it until the 
informer got out and entered Officer McBee's automobile. 
On November 27,1956, the informer again made a telephone 
call to defendant, which was also recorded (and later played 
to the jury), and arranged to purchase heroin from him at 
a bar. Officer McBee and the informer then went to the 
vicinity of the bar. Later Officer Hilliard joined them, and 
after listening to the recorded conversa.tion he obtained a war-
rant to search defendant's premises. 
On November 27th Officers Goodrum, Reppas,and W oishnis 
kept defendant's residence under surveillance. Officer Hil-
liard instructed them to follow defendant when he left his 
residence and arrest him at the first opportunity. There-
after defendant left his residence in an automobile. Be 
stopped at the intersection of Adeline and Market Streets 
f~r. '-_ traffic signal, and the officers drove their automobile in 
front of his and told him that he was under arrest. They told 
him to back his car into a gas station and to get out and 
place his hands on top of the car. As he got out of the car, 
Officer Woishnis observed a "silvery flutter" and said: "He 
dropped it." Officer Goodrum saw something shiny "hit off 
of his [defendant's] shoe and land on the ground .••• " 
Officer Reppas picked up four tinfoil packages and asked 
defendant: "What about these'" Defendant said he didn't 
know anything about them. A smaller package wrapped in 
cellophane was found in defendant's pocket. All five packages 
eontained heroin. The officers, together with Officers Billiard 
and McBee,then went to defendant's residence and searched 
it. They found $1,058, including a $20 bill, a $10 bill and a 
$5.00 bill on which an ultraviolet light disclosed a large 
amount of fluorescent powder. The prosecution's evidence 
also showed that defendant made certain admissions after his 
arrest. .. 
Defendant testified that he was not a party to the alleged 
telephone conversations, denied the alleged meeting with the 
informer, and denied that he had possession of narcotics on 
November 27th. 
During the cross-examination of Officers McBee and Bil-
liard before the jury and of Officer Hilliard on the hearing on 
probable cause in the absence of the jury, the trial court sus-
tained on the ground of privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, 
subd. 5) the prosecution's objection to questions by the de-
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fense seeking to obtain the name of the informer. Defendani~ 
contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
iuataining thooc objections.-
Count One: The Sale of Heroin on November 26, 1956 
[1] Since the alleged sale by the defendant was to the 
informer, defendant was clearly entitled to disclosure of his 
identity. (Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 58 [77 
S.Ot. 623, 1 L.Ed. 639] ; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d 
694, 696 [316 P.2d 1006] ; People v. Cas tiel, 153 Cal.App.2d 
653, 656-659 [315 P.2d 79]; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. 
App.2d 435, 451 [308 P.2d 821].) The People contend, how-
ever, that defendant was not prejudiced invoking the evidence 
that defendant received two telephone calls from the informer 
and that he made a sale to the informer to establish that the 
defendant knew the informer's identity. That very evidence 
was in issue, however, for defendant denied that he received 
such calls or that he made such a sale. There was no finding 
that the defendant knew the informer and it cannot be 
assumed that he did. Such an assumption would in effect 
assume his guilt. (See R01'iaro v. United States, supra, 353 
U.S. at 60.) 
Count Two: The Possession of Heroin on November 27, 1956 
The People seek to uphold the conviction on count two on 
the grounds that the informer's identity has no bearing on 
that charge and that in any event there is a privilege of 
nondisclosure of informers. 
[2] The common-law privilege of nondisclosure is based 
on public policy. "The purpose of the privilege is the fur-
therance and protection of the public interest in effective law 
enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citi-
zens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of 
crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their 
anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation." 
(Rotliaro v. United States, IUpra, 353 U.S. at 59.) The in-
former is thus assured of some protection against reprisals. 
The use of informers is particularly effective in the enforce-
mentof sumptuary laws such as those directed against gam-
bling, prostitution, or the sale and use of liquor and narcotics. 
Disclosure of the informer's identity ordinarily destroys his 
usefulness in obtaining information thereafter. (See Don-
-Defendant does not contend that the reeorded telephone conversations 
were an unlawul interception and therefore inadmissible. (See People 
v. MaloHe, (6 CaUld 59, 6{ [292 P.2d 517].) 
Oct. 1958] PEoPLE tJ. McSRANN 
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nelly, .Tudicial Control of Informanis, Spies, Siool Pigeon" 
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale L. J. 1091, 1093; 1 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 405, 512.) 
[Sa] Section 18tH, subdivision 5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure encompasses the privilege of nondisclosure of in-
formers: "A public officer cannot be examined as to commu-
nications made to him in official confidence, when the public 
interest would suffer. by the disclosure." There is a divergence 
of opinion as to whether the common-law privilege covers 
only the identity of the informer or also includes the contents 
of the communication. (See McCormick, Evidence (1954], 
pp. 309-311; Donnelly, IUpra, 60 Yale L. J. at 1094-1095; 
98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 719, 730.) Since the reasons for the 
privilege relate primarily to the identity of the informer, 
some authorities take the position that the privilege does not 
extend to the communications unless the contents would dis-
close or tend to disclose the identity of the informer. (See 
Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.l, vol. 8, p. 755; McCormick, 
supra, p. 310.) Under section 1881, subdivision 5 it extends 
to the communications "when the public interest would 
suffer by the disclosure." 
[4] It is for the court to determine whether the public 
interest will suffer by disclosure. (See Dwelly v. McReyn-
olds, 6 Cal.2d 128, 131 [56 P.2d 1232] ; Wigmore, IUpra, vol. 
8 at 798-801; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 667,676.) [6] At common law 
the privilege could not be invoked if the identity of the 
informer was known to those who had cause to resent the 
communication. (See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 
60 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639].) [3b] Under section 1881, 
subdivision 5 the test is whether the public interest would 
suffer by the disclosure. Conceivably, even when the informer 
may be known to persons who have cause to resent the 
communication, disclosure in open court might still be against 
the public interest. [6] A--defendant who knows the iden-
tity of the informer, however, will ordinarily not be preju-
diced by a refusal to disclose that identity. 
[7] There is general agreement that there is no privilege 
of nondisclosure if disclosure "is relevant and helpful to the 
defense of the accused or essential to a fair determination of 
R cause ... " (Roviaro v. United States, supra, 353 U.S. at 
60-61; see People v. Castiel, supra, 153 Cal.App.2d at 659; 
People v. Lawrence, supra, 149 CalApp.2d at 451; Portornene 
v. U'liited States, 221 F.2d 582, 583-584; U'liited States v. 
CO'lforti, 200 F.2d 365, 367; Sorrenti'110 v. United States, 163 
) 
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F.2d 627, 628-629; Unitea States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d . 
650, 651-652; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390, 392; 
Marks v. R('.'II/1,Il, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 404, 498; Centoamore v .. 
State, 105 Neb. 452 [181 N.W. 182, 183] ; McCormick, supra, \ 
p. 310; Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence [1954], p. 119; I 
Wharton, Criminal Evidence [12th ed.], vol. 3, pp. 136-137; 
Wigmore, supra, vol. 8, p. 756; Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 
vol. 2, pp. 820-821; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 667, 670; 98 U. of Pa. 
L. Rev. 719, 730-731; 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 239, 244-245; Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, rule 36.) 
[8] Disclosure is not limited to the informer who partici-
pates in the crime alleged. The information elicited from an 
informer may be "relevant and helpful to the defense of the 
accused or essential to a fair determination of a cause" even 
though the informer was not a participant. For example, 
the testimony of an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer that 
would vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk 
of false testimony would obviously be relevant and helpful to 
the defense of the accused and essential to a fair determination 
of the cause. 
Disclosure is frequently a problem in such cases as the 
present one involving violations of the narcotics laws, when 
the so-called informer is also a material witness on the issue 
of guilt. A mere informer has a limited role. "When such 
a person is truly an informant he simply points the finger of 
suspicion toward a person who has violated the law. He puts 
the wheels in motion which cause the defendant to be sus-
pected and perhaps arrested, but he plays no part in the 
criminal act with which the defendant is later charged." 
(People v. Lawrence, 8'Upra, 149 Cal.App.2d at 450.) [9] His 
identity is ordinarily not necessary to the defendant's case, 
and the privilege against disclosure properly applies. 
[10] When it appears from the evidence, however, that 
the informer is also a material witness on the issue of guilt, 
his identity is relevant and may be helpful to the defendant. 
Nondisclosure would deprive him of a fair trial. [11] Thus, 
when it appears from the evidence that the informer is a 
material witness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks 
disclosure on cross-examination, the People must either dis-
close his identity or incur a dismissal. (See Rovwro v. United 
States, supra, 353 U.S. at 61.) Any implications to the con-
trary in PeopZe v. Cox, 156 Cal.App.2d 472, 477 [319 P.2d 
681], and People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal.App.2d 487, 440-441 
[288 P.2d 588], are disapproved. 
Oet.1958] PEOPLE tI. MCSRANN 
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Jencks v. United Statu, 853 U.S. 657, 671-672 177 S.Ct. 
1007,1 L.Ed.2d 1103], involved a comparable situation where-
in the defendant sought the production of F.B.I. reports made 
by the two principal witnesses against him on a charge that 
he falsely swore in an a1Bdavit that he was not a member of 
the communist party. The court stated: "It is unquestion-
ably true that the protection of vital national interests may 
militate against public disclosure of documents in the Gov-
ernment's possession .... The Attorney General has adopted 
regulations ••• declaring all Justice Department records con-
fidential and that no disclosure, including disclosure in re-
sponse to a subpoena, may be made without his permission. 
"But this Court has noticed in United States v. Reynolds, 
345 U.S. 1 [73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727, 82 A.L.R.2d 382], 
the holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
that, in criminal causes '. • • the Government can invoke its 
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defend-
ant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since 
the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the 
duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow 
it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental 
privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be 
material to his defense .... ' 345 U.S., at 12." 
[12] Likewise, if the informer in the present case was a 
material witness as to the possession charged in count two, 
the refusal to disclose his identity was prejudicial error as 
to that count. 
Defendant denied that he had heroin in his possession and 
denied that he received the alleged telephone call. Officer 
McBee and Oflicer Hilliard testified to the telephone call, and 
a recording thereof cut by Officer Hilliard was played before 
the jury. The informer's telephone call was persuasive evi-
dence on possession, for it indicated that defendant was en 
route to make a sale of heroin when he was arrested and 
therefore knowingly had· possession at that time. As the 
originator of the telephone call the informer was a material 
witness on the issue of possession. The prosecution made him 
such a witness by introducing evidence of his telephone call 
to make a purchase of heroin and by playing a recording of 
the telephone conversation before the jury. 
The prosecution could have relied solely on the testimony 
of the omcers as to defendant's possession of heroin and as 
to his admissions without reference to the telephone call. 
Thev p.\ose instead also to introduce evidence of the telephone 
) 
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. call, which substantiated the testimony of Officers Goodrum . 
and Reppas and discredited defendant's. Defendant denied 
receiving the call. He had no fair opportunity to substantiate 
I1Is denial and impeach the testimony of the officers without , 
disclosure of the informer's identity. Had there been dis- I 
closure, the informer might have testified that no suCh tele-
phone Call was made, that it was not defendant who received 
the call, that someone else was called, or that there was an 
entrapment. 
The cross-examination of Officers McBee and Hilliard as to 
the telephone call and the identity of its originator dealt 
with an alleged telephone call to the defendant setting up a 
sale and the identity of the person making that call. It did 
not deal with communications made to them "in confidence" 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (5» or with the identity of 
a person making communications "in confidence." 
There are strong parallels between the instant case and 
BOtIiaro v. United States, aupra. 353 U.S. at 58-59, wherein 
defendant was charged with a sale of heroin (connt one) and 
with "illegal transportation of narcotics" (count two). A 
conviction under count two was proper "when the Govern-
ment has proved that the accused possessed narcotics, unless 
the accused explains or justifies such possession." (353 U.S. 
at 63.) The Government sought to uphold the conviction on 
count two on the ground that the identity of the informer 
(John Doe) had no bearing on that charge and was therefore 
privileged. The Government had introduced evidence that 
John Doe had a conversation in his car with defendant as he 
drove him to a place where defendant got out of the car, 
walked to a nearby tree, picked up a small package, returned 
and deposited the package in Doe's car and left in another 
car. An officer secreted in the trunk of Doe's car testified 
to the conversation between Doe and the defendant, and both 
he and another officer testified that they saw the defendant 
pick up the small package and return to Doe's car. The 
package contained an opium derivative. The court held that 
under the circumstances, "John Doe's possible testimony was 
highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense .•.. 
The informer was the only witness [other than the accused] 
in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of gov-
ernment witnesses." (353 U.S. at 63-64.) 
Although the informer in the present case was not an eye-
witness to the crime, as John Doe was in the Roviaro case, 
the prosecution's own election to introduce evidence of the 
) 
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telephone conversation made it imperative that it disclose the 
identity of thf' infoTTnm', for he alone could amplify or con-
tradict the testimony of the officers. As in the Roviaro ease 
nondisclosure was prejudicial error. 
The judgment is reversed as to both counts. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
reversal as to count one but dissent from the reversal as to 
count two. In my opinion, the case of R01Jiaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 8.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639], is not 
authority for the majority's reversal as to both counts, but 
on the contrary, clearly indicates that the judgment of con-
viction on the second count should be affirmed. 
In the Roviaro case, the two charges were (1) sale of 
narcotics and (2) illegal transportation of narcotics. Both 
charges arose out of a single transaction occurring on August 
12, 1954. The Government did not "defend the nondis-
closure of Doe's identity with respect to Count 1, which 
charged a sale of heroin to John Doe," but it sought "to sus-
tain the judgment on the basis of the conviction on Count 
2, charging illegal transportation of narcotics." (Pp. 58-59.) 
The court there held that, under the circumstances, it was 
reversible error as to both counts for the trial court to deny 
disclosure of the identity of the informer. 
In so holding with respect to the second count, the court, 
after stating that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is 
justifiable" (p. 62), was careful to point out that the second 
count there did not "charge mere possession" (p. 63); that 
the informer had "been present with the accused at the occur-
rence of the alleged crime" of illegal transportation (p. 55) ; 
and that "the Government's informer was the sole participant, 
other than the accused, in the transaction charged" (p. 64). 
In the present case, count two did charge "mere possession" ; 
the informer was not" present with the accused at the occur-
rence of the alleged crime" charged in count two; and the 
informer was not a participant in the offense of "mere pos-
session" on November 27, 1956, as distinguished from the 
prior offense of sale on November 26, 1956. 
If, as declared in the Roviaro case, the problem is one of 
"balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of infor-
mation against the individual's right to prepare his defense" ; 
and if the question of error in refusing disclosure depends 
812 PRIEBTLY 11. SUPERIOR COURT 150 C.2d 
"on the particular circumstances of each case" (p. 62), I am 
of the view that the balance here is clearly in favor of the 
public interest. The compelling reasons for preventing dis-
closure of the identity of informers, except where the inter-
ests of justice demand it, are forcefully stated in the dissent 
of Mr. Justice Clark in the Roviaro case. Here, however, we 
have only to follow the implications of the majority opinion 
in that case in order to sustain the judgment of conviction as 
to count two. 
I would therefore reverse as to count one but affirm as to 
count two. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the reversal of the judgment as to count one, but dissent from 
the reversal of the judgment as to count two. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
28,1958. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
